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1. Introduction
When a regulated firm considers the undertaking of an effort 
to innovate, it often faces incentives quite different from those 
confronting an unregulated firm. At least three types of uncertainty 
arise. First, will an innovative effort result in an implementable 
technology, and if so, when? Second, will the implementation of the 
technology be delayed by a regulatory authority, and if so, for how 
long? And finally, when the regulator permits the use of an innovation, 
what level of benefits will the firm ultimately receive? 
The first of these questions is not unique to regulation. 
The rather extensive literature devoted to this issue has been 
summarized by Kamien and Schwartz. In the past decade a number of 
theoretical efforts have shown how the structure of industrial markets, 
the rate of technological progress in those markets, and the incentives 
for a firm to innovate are affected by uncertainty about the time 
required for an effort to innovate to reach technological fruition. 1
Virtually· all of the more theoretical studies on research 
and development have focused on unregulated markets, the most notable 
exception being a study by Klevorick. 2 Klevorick examined the effects
of stochastic regulatory review on the innovative effort undertaken 
by a regulated firm, and characterized the optimal policy of a firm 
facing the prospect of regulatory lag. He emphasized the effects of 
changes in the length of regulatory lag., and in the probability that 
a firm will undergo regulatory review. Our work differs from his in 
that we focus on the uncertainty of the length of the delay between 
I 
I the time of innovation and the time at which a firm r'eceiveis pe 
to adopt the innovation. 
A number of other studies have addressed inD.ovlt4on in 
regulated industries, but these have primarily been o� dlsJript J 
empirical nature. The empirical investigations have lar�e{ at_ 
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These figures alone do not provide a basis for i de erm:l! 
whether the transportation industry has performed well oJ p orl��­
innuvariun. Friedlaender emphaafae• rhis by pointing! J ' ar 'Ii I 
is no operational standard against which performance can l be judg I 
The figures do not reflect the extent to which potential op ortjl J 
for innovation in the industry were exploited, a poinl that makj l 
comparison of rates of innovation across industries eten lmote 
difficult. 6 I 
Instead of addressing the aggregate rate of l inJovation 
for an entire industry, we direct our analysis to the l fi1m 
itself. We specify a model of a regulated firm that fac�s all ti 
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types of uncertainty described at the outset of this paper. We focus 
on the incentives created by regulatory delay, and in particular on 
the uncertainty introduced by the regulatory process. It is this 
focus that differentiates this work from most other studies of research 
and development. Material from selected case studies in surface 
freight transport will be used to shape and illustrate the analysis. 
We first examine some widely held views about innovation 
and regulation, and show why efforts to innovate are diminished for 
higher discount rates, higher costs of participating in the regulatory 
process, and longer regulatory delays. We will also show why 
uncertainty about the level of benefits ultimately to be received 
may not affect the level of R&D effort for at least some firms. 
And finally, we will show why a regulated firm may actually prefer 
to face uncertainty about the length of regulatory delay, and 
choose to engage in more R&D under uncertainty than it would if the 
regulatory delay were known with certainty in advance. 
2. Examples of Regulatory Delay 
Before formulating a model of innovation with regulatory 
delay, it would be useful to consider a few examples that illustrate 
the nature of the dilemma that transport firms face when deciding 
whether to engage in R&D. If regulators delay the implementation of 
innovation, then there can be no doubt that incentives to innovate are 
dampened. Briefly, we examine two specific innovations, the Big John 
Hopper railroad car for shipping grain and the unit train. 
The Big John Hopper 
During the late 1950s the shipments of grain tol tHe So 
grew at a rapid rate. Most of the increased shipments[ were !made 
barges or by motor carriers rather than by railroads. 7 T�e ISout� 
Railway System designed a large aluminum Big John Hopp'er larl to
tr�•port grain at a lower oo•t, and attamptad to �e rhe l i o�a• 
to justify lower tariffs for its grain shipments. Southetn prop�
new tariffs for grain shipments that were, on average, ! si1t per�l l
below the existing tariffs; without regulatory delay the ba iffs 
would have beoo� effeotive in Aug�t, 1961. 8 I I Not surprisingly, the barge shippers objected tb he ne· 
tariff. 9 After numerous delays, the ICC finally deciJed bo disa� 
the l=& tariffa on July 1, 1963, = the grounda tbaj thl ropo� 
low tariffs would cause unfair and destructive competJtiol n vil 
of the National Transportation Policy. 10 On appeal, J dibt ict j 
set aside the ICC decision in 1964, based on the lack b  bu stan� 
evidence in the record to support the ICC decision. 11 I Thi upreJ, 
I II
Court later vacated the decision of the district court[ and emand 
12 I the case to the ICC for reconsideration. In August, 1965,I the 
 
finally approved the lower tariffs, four years after Southenn 
announced its intention to introduce the Big John Hopp�r. f3 
The Unit Train 
Railroad costs are also reduced when large amount 
single commodity can be consolidated for movement on � siig 
A train movement dedicated to hauling only one commodiity, I f
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coal transported from a mine to a utility, will require less switching 
in transit, and lower costs overall. 
Unit train movements were used by the federal government as 
14 early as World War I. Yet they were not widely adopted by 
the railroads until much later. MacAvoy and Sloss have argued 
persuasively that ICC regulation delayed the adoption of the innovation 
because of rate restrictions placed on commodities. 15 In particular,
the ICC restrictions would have required that a lower rate filed for 
unit train movements be applied to any shipper using similar services. 
Thus, "unless the savings on the innovation, in this case the unit 
trains, are sufficiently great to offset the revenue reductions on the 
traffic that currently moves at higher rates, the innovation will not 
be adopted. 1116
In the case of unit trains, the regulatory restriction on 
tariffs effectively reduced the expected benefit from the innovation. 
As we shall show more formally in section four this has the consequence 
of deterring the rate of expenditures on developing better unit train 
technology. 
These examples are not presented for the purpose of examining 
the merits of the arguments involved. Rather, they illustrate the · 
powerful effects of the regulatory process in determining the level 
of benefit ultimately accruing to an innovator, in introducing 
uncertainty about the level of benefits, and in causing regulatory 
delay of uncertain length to be a part of the environment within which 
a firm must make its decision whether to engage in R&D. A number of 
other examples of the effects of regulation on innovation could be 
I 
cited to illustrate similar points. 17 These considerJtiolslhelp 
shape the model of innovation and regulation to which lwe low tura 
3. A Model of Innovation and Regulatory Delay I 
Consider a regulated firm that is deciding whethe 
I . undertake an effort to innovate, and that faces all tlireel o
of uncertainty described at the outset of section one lof �h 
We shall assume that if the firm elects to undertake the br 
enters into a fixed cost R&D contract. 18 Let us denoJe the 
I I value of the cost of the R&D effort as being x dollars, whe 
level of x is chosen by the firm. 19 This money will ble sie 
or not the project results in an actual innovation, ajd iid 
I I whether regulators ultimately allow the innovation to re t Given the decision to spend x dollars on R&D1, the 
uncertainty about the arrival time of a technologically fla
Although the firm .does not know exactly when the innoJatibn
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 it does assign some probability that the innovation wi�l bcdur be 
any given time (e. g. , t1) when the size of its R&D pro�rai �s x 
dollars. 20 Moreover, the firm believes that by increabin� �.it 
increase the probability that the innovation will arri�e �y 1any 
specified time. 21 
Once the innovation is developed, the firm may �a�e to 
seek regulatory approval in order to implement the innbvabi 
particularly if the firm seeks changes in tariffs or oberlt:" 
as a result of the innovation. Of course, not all innbvabio: 
· 1 1 · · 1 . I l require regu atory approva prior to imp ementation, partic, 
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that do not present a problem with safety, pose a threat to other firms' 
profits, or require tariff adjustments for the innovating firm. These 
innovations do not concern us since regulatory delay is not an issue. 
However, two further uncertainties do arise when the 
regulatory action is required. The first is the uncertainty about the 
length of the delay, which we denote by t2. Thus, the total time from 
the initiation of the R&D effort until actual implementation will be 
(t1 +t2), where implementation does not occur until the regulatory
delay is completed. 22 The length of t2 to some extent depends on the
resistance that the innovator will encounter during the delay. Let us 
represent the extent of this resistance by R. For example, R might 
be thought of as the extent of rivalry from intermodal competitors, 
whose market shares might decline if the innovation is adopted at 
tariffs prop·osed by the innovator. As mentioned earlier, when the 
Southern decided to develop the Big John Hopper, it encountered 
much resistance from the barges and other shippers. Thus, qualitatively, 
R was large in that· case. 
Given a level of resistance, R, there remains uncertainty 
about the length of the delay, t2. Although the firm does not know
exactly when the delay will end, it does assign some probability that 
the delay will be shorter than any given duration (e. g. , t2).
23
Moreover, the firm believes that a higher level of resistance, R, will 
reduce the probability that the regulatory delay will end by any 
specified time. 24
Finally, there is uncertainty about the extent to which the 
firm will benefit from the innovation. For example, if the innovation 
reduce• the co•t of provid<ng a aenri.ce aubject to int•�ld 
competition, the firm does not know in advance what will l1ttmate1 
the tariff in effect for its own service, for the servlceJ p ovid 
its rivals, or the exact amount the cost reduction actha1ly chiJ I I We assume that the level of dollar benefits (additional pJof�ts) 
accruing to the firm after t2 will be a flow of b dolllrsj l!\.lthd 
b is uncertain, we assume that the firm can assign soml plobabil 
that the level of benefits will be less than any partibu1lr �eve] 
(e. g. , b1), given the level of resistance, R. 
25 I I Although a change in R may affect the probabiliJy bf 
receiving at least b1 dollars, the direction of the efkecl is noti  obvious. On one hand, with strong intermodal competition tan! 
innovator may encounter stronger arguments against the l tarif�s an 
other conditions of service it proposes following an innojat�on. 
Thus, expected benefits might decline as rivalry increlseJ. 
On the other hand, a firm facing stronger inlenlodal 
competition might expect to capture large shares of thl mdrket fr: 
its competitors if an innovation is successful. Thus, e�ected 
benefits might increase with more rivalry. 26
We assume that the firm selects the level of R&D er:end. 
x, to maximize T, the present value of the expected profils esuJ I 
from the effort to innovate, where the discount rate fbr lhe firJ 1 
27 I  r. There are three components that when added together, cpmpr 
First, as stated earlier, the present value of the cosl oJ the R& 
project is x. 28 Second, between t1, when the innovatibn lrr�ves, 
(t1 + t2), wh= the regulatory delay fa concluded, the }11 '' inv 
be 
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in legal proceedings before the regulator, and perhaps the court 
system. We assume that the firm incurs a procedural cost flow of L 
dollars to maintain a "standard" level of effort in those proceedings. 
(We do not specify the level of effort as a decision variable for the 
firm; this possibility suggests an interesting extension of the present 
analysis. ) Thus the present value of these procedural expenditures 
incurred between t1 and (t1 +t2) constitutes the second component of T.
29 
The third component of T is the present value of the benefit 
flow. We assume that the benefits, b, are received forever after time 
(t1+t2).
3° Finally, the firm determines T by adding all three 
components, and by taking the expectation of the sum over all of the 
possible values of the uncertain variables t1, t2, and b.
31
then chooses that level of x that maximizes T. 32
The firm 
4. Effects of a Change in Discount Rate, Procedural Cost, and the 
Extent of Intermodal Competition on Innovation 
Three observations can be stated immediately about the 
incentives to innovate for the regulated firm. These do not deal with 
uncertainty, a topic that we reserve for section five. We begin by 
asking how a change in the discount rate would affect the level of 
innovation. 33
Proposition 1. A higher discount rate reduces the 
amount of innovation undertaken by the firm. This 
,effect is observed even in the absence of regulatory 
34 delay (i. e. , even when t2 = 0). 
 I The raCionale f� Chia acac�nc ia acraighcfn�ai . � 
pr��ce of a diBcn�c faccnr �• Chae Che firm weig�a l d 11� 
received (or apenc) earlier in Che acre� of cime more helwi y chllil a doll� received (or apenc) lacer on. Since che fi� incuja &D J�r• 
and procedural costs before it receives benefits, a hikhej d'scojl I 
race makes innnvaci� leaa accraceive. I I One might also expect that a higher procedural dos�, L, 
leads to less innovation. Higher procedural costs makl aJy
innovation less profitable if that innovation is subjelt Jo
delays. Proposition 2 shows that this is true. . I 
Proposition 2. An increase in procedural cost, L, 
I 
leada CO a lower level of i��aCinn hy Che fi�. rS 
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We next turn to the effect of increased rivalry l(e 
increased intermodal competition). Increased rivalry lffect 
incentives to innovate in two ways. First, more intenJe ilt 
compeCici� Cypically lengchens regulaCn'J' delay. Seclnd,I ieither increase or reduce the level of benefits, b, ullimate 
by the innovator, as noted earlier. Thus, the two efflcts! c 
make the effects of increased intermodal competition oJ tJe: y 
�ef mbineate 
innovation generally ambiguous. 
Proposition 3. Increased intermodal competition wil] 
decrease the level of innovative effort if the prlbaJil�ty 
of receiving at least b1 dollars of net benefits emlin
constant or falls as competition becomes more intlnsJ , I 
(R rises) for all b1• Otherwise, the level of innovative
effort may either rise or fall as intermodal competition 
becomes more intense. 36
In other words, increased intermodal competition can be 
11 
expected to lengthen regulatory delay. If it also lowers expected 
benefits, then innovation looks less attractive to the firm. However, 
if it raises expected benefits, then the firm expects higher benefits 
at a more distant time, and the present value of the innovation 
(and thus the incentive to innovate) may either rise or fall in that 
case. 
5. Effects of Uncertainty on the Effort to Innovate 
In this section we examine how uncertainty about the level 
of benefits and the extent of regulatory delay affect the firm. We 
ask whether a firm facing uncertainty about the length of regulatory 
delay and the ultimate flow of benefits would change its level of 
innovative effort if it knew in advance with certainty what the delay 
and benefit flow would be. 
To start with we note that the phrase "with certainty" is 
imprecise. The choice of an appropriate meaning is not obvious. We 
employ the following notions in the work that follows. 
Definition 1. "Certainty about the level of benefit 
flow" is defined to mean that the firm knows in 
advance that the flow of benefits will be equal to 
the mean of the probability distribution for b, 
b (R). 37
Definition 2. "Certainty about the length of regulajo 
in ldJnc delay" is defined to mean that the firm knows 
that the actual delay will be the mean of the 
distribution for t2, t2(R).
38
protb�liJ:y 
Then the following two statements can be made immediately. '39 
I , Proposition 4. The firm undertakes the same level of 
innovative effort under either uncertainty or cerkaiJty 
about the level of benefit flow. 
, I I 
Proposition 5. The firm expects the same profit under 
uncertainty as under certainty about the level of 
benefit flow. I 
These statements are possible because the firm �s 
to be risk neutra1. 40 Of course, if the firm knew in ldvdnc - I I the actual benefit flow would differ from the mean, b (l,l), th 
firm would prefer that certain knowledge to a state of l uncer 
But absent such knowledge, the innovative effort of the f�rm
affected by uncertainty about the level of benefit flol. I 
F<nally, - <= Co Che effecc of =c&<ainct +" 
regulatory delay on the level of innovation. If anything,
 
o 
expect that the firm would prefer to operate with certlinty 
than uncertainty, since timing is an important aspect Jf Jnn 
particurarly if the firm incurs costs of coordination khaJ a
the actual time of regulatory delay differs from the e�e�te 
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of the delay. Obviously, if these coordination costs are high enough, 
then the firm would indeed prefer certainty to uncertainty. 
However, the point of the following two propositions is 
that a firm might not always prefer certainty to uncertainty. In 
particular, we show this for the case in which no such coordination 
costs are incurred. Using the notion of uncertainty of Definition 2, 
it turns out that, absent coordination costs, the firm would prefer 
uncertainty about the length of regulatory delay. Further, the 
firm would undertake a higher level of innovative effort under 
uncertainty. 
Proposition 6. Without coordination costs, the firm 
innovates more under uncertainty than under certainty 
41 about the length of regulatory delay. 
4 Proposition 7. Without coordination costs, the firm 
prefers uncertainty to certainty about the length of 
. � the regulatory delay. 
Although these results may appear to be counterintuitive, 
they do make sense after some reflection. To show how, we construct 
the following example. Assume that an innovation has just been 
achieved, i.e., we have arrived at time t • The annual benefit flow
1 
that will be realized when t2 is reached (after regulatory delay has 
occurred and the innovation can be implemented) is known to be 
$1 million. The regulatory delay is uncertain, but the firm assumes_ 
that it will be one year, two years, or three years with an equal 
I 
probability of one-third in each case. There are no coordin�tion 
For simplicity, assume that L = 0, i.e., the prodedtralj 
costs are zero. Then Table 1 enables us to calculate hhelpr sen 
value of the expected benefits of the innovation, discbuntledl to 
time t1. Note that the present value of the expected �enJfi 
innovation is $8.22 million, when the discount rate islasJum 
costs. 
of 
d to: 
be ten percent. 
For the case of certainty, we assume that t21 is lknbwn � 
equal the mean (or average) value of delay of two year$. !Bu�, as 
Table 1 shows, the benefit corresponding to a delay ofltwo years 
$8.18 million, which is less than the expected benefitlof 1$8L22 
for the case with uncertainty. I 
The reason for the preference for uncertainty is now 
ion 
apparent. The firm is willing to take a chance that t�e lel�y 
be less than the mean since it discounts earlier earnilgs ltola ::��er 
extent than later earnings. I I We reemphasize that a certain knowledge that the attua 
delay would differ from the mean may lead the firm to revJrse its 
I , preference for uncertainty. However, absent such certain lknbwle 
with small or no coordination costs, the firm may actul11� under 
an R&D project under uncertainty about the length of rlgu�attry d
f that it would not pursue if it knew in advance that thl dJla woul 
be the mean of the distribution. 
and 
.y 
Regulatory 
Delay (Years)
(1) 
1 
2 
3 
TABLE 1 
Expected Benefit of Innovation: Example 
Probability of Delay Present Value of
of Column 1 Benefits at t1 
(2) (3)43 
1/3 $9.05 million 
1/3 $8.18 million 
1/3 $7. 41 million 
15 
Col (2) x Col (3) 
(4) 
$3.02 million 
$2.73 million 
$2.47 million-
Present value of expected benefit = $8.22 million 
6. Conclusion
1 1 We have analyzed a formal model of regulatoiy de�·y ana drawn a number of conclusions. Several of these conclusilori 
correspond to widely accepted notions about the effecJ ofl tl1Le 
regulatory process on innovation. Higher discount raJes,I h�gher 
costs of engaging the administrative process, and lonJer �eiulatb 
delay all serve to diminish the amount of R&D undertaJen byithe 
regulated firm. Increased intermodal competition has lamblg�ous 
 
leve effects on incentives for innovation. Uncertainty ablut fn 
of the benefit flow does not affect incentives for R&D fa� 
neutral firm. And finally, uncertainty about the lenJth bf 
regulatory delay may actually increase incentives to Jnnorale, 
I Irisk 
particularly if coordination costs are small. 
dela: In an effort to focus on the effects of regulatb 
we ha� �de a n�ber of '"'plifying atr�t�al �a�tio�althae 
suggest directions for further research. One potential dir ction 
for research would be to expand the scope of the modeJ to i vest] 
broader qu�tiD� aboue �rkee equcllil>ri�, in the a� '"j' � � 
Loury, and Lee and Wilde have extended the analysis 0£ KJm: n and 
Schwartz.44 Such a model would explicitly include thJ thle t of
innovation by other firms competing with any given fiJm. I wou] 
alao require a aeruceure eo replace ehe par-eric re,iaean e J par�ter R in ehia pap�, aa well aa a �re derailed lreple enea of the decision mechanism used by regulators in determinilg lthe I I benefits allowed and the length of regulatory delay. �ile these IIented 
should prove helpful in those further efforts. 
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in the Big John Hopper case, the Southern had placed some of the 
grain cars in service, and at some lower tariffs, during the 
delay. But the full benefits of the innovation were far from 
being realized during this time. See Gellman (n. 8 supra) p. 177. 
The qualitative results about the effects of regulatory delay on 
innovation, which we develop below, would hold even if some (but 
not all) benefits are realized before the delay is over. 
23. Let g (t2, R) represent the probability density function for the
length of regulatory delay, given R. Then G (t2, R) is the
corresponding ·cumulative density function, which states the
probability that the delay will be shorter than t2, given R.
24. This statement is equivalent to the condition that G (t2,R)
declines as R increases, or, following the notation of n. 21,
supra, GR (t2, R) < O.
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
Let h (b,R) represent the probability density fundtion or tn 
level of benefits, b, given R. Then H (b,R) is tJe clr espo�, 
cumulative density function, which states the prolabll : ty t� 
the level of benefit will be no more than b dollals ii en R J 
I This statement is equivalent to the condition tha
l 
H
f
b',IR) ma
.
' 
or fall as R increases, or, following the notation of J. 2l j 
�(b,R) has no determinate sign. [ [ 
The notion of present value is discussed in n. 191, su 
By working wi<h '"'Pec<ed profi<•, we �e �•omingl '�' <he < 
is risk neutral rather than risk averse or risk lbvitig. (SJ 
Varian, H., Microeconomic Analy'1s, Nor<on, 1978, 1 pp ! 08-1� 
Suppose the firm could accept a lottery which wouid �i e it j 
dollars with probability p, and y dollars with prbba�i •ty 1 
If the firm is indifferent between accepting the lotbe anJ I I . accepting [pw + (1 - p)y] dollars with certainty, theJ ilt is 
neutral. If it prefers the former, it is risk lotinJ ; if iti 
prefers the latter, it is risk averse. . I 
I 
See n. 19, supra. Since it is a cost, its contribution! to
-x. 
ng 
rise 
uora, 
p). 
k 
29. The expected present value of this component of the present
value of profit is therefore
tl +t2 
23 
-J L e
-rtdt
tl 
(1) 
30. The expected present value of the benefit stream is
31. 
J
00
b e -rtdt
tl + t2 
(2) 
Formally, the present value of the expected profits from the 
innovation can be written as 
00 00 tl + t2 
T (x,R,r,L) = -x +l l {<-L) '( e-rtdt0 0 { 1 (3) 
oo +oo } + J [f_00 bh (b,R)db]e-rtdt f (t1,x)g (t2, R)dt1dt2tl + t2 
- L°" f°" -rt -x + L+b (R) e-rtl f (tl,x)dtl e 2 g (t2,R)dt2r o o 
� L°"e
-rtl f(tl,x)dtlR o 
32. 
Loo Loo - -rt -rt -x + (L+b (R)) e 2 F (t1,x)dt1 e I 2 lg�f2,R) 0 0 
lo:.> -rt - L e 1 F (t1,x)dt10 
where 
b (R) = 1: bh (b,R)db , the mean of h (b,R)
The first order necessary condition for an optimum 
x > 0 is: 
- -rt -rt loo Loo TX= -1 + (L+b (R)) 0 e 1 Fx (t1,x)dt1 0 e 2 gKt2r)�t2 
Loo -rt - L e 1 Fx (t1,x)dt1 = O.0 
I 
Lo:.> -rt Further, define $x (x) to be 0 e 1 Fx (t1,x)dt1. [Then trom 
Eq. 5, we have 
$x (x) l/{[L+b(R)] L
00
e-rt2 g (t2, R)dt2 - L} > 0 
Finally, at a maximum of T, then T < 0, which implieis, !:hat 
{5) 
6) 
xx I I $ (x) < 0. For a discussion of necessary and sufficient confilllll:ions 
f: optimality, see Varian (n. 27, supra), pp. 26J-2617. 
33. 
34. 
25 
For a discussion of the discount rate, see n. 19 supra. 
Proof: From equations (5) and (6), n. 32, it follows that 
Txr Joo Joo -rt - -rt -t1 e 1 Fx(t1, x)dt1 [(L+b(R)) e 2 g(t2, R)dt2 - L] 0 0 
- -rt -rt Joo Joo -t2 (L+b(R)) 0 e 2 Fx(t1, x)dt1 0 e 2 g(t2, R)dt2 < 0
Thus dx/dr = -T /T < 0, even if t2 = O. For a discussion ofxr xx 
comparative statics, used to prove this and subsequent propositions, 
see Varian (n. 27), pp. 267-269. 
35. Proof: From Equation (5), n. 32, and the fact that 
Joo -rt 0 e 2 g (t2, R)dt2 < 1 when there is any possibility of regulatory
delay, it follows that 
-rt -rt Loo [oo TxL = e 1 Fx (t1, x)dt1 [ e 2 g(t2, R)dt2 - 1 ] < O 0 ·O 
Thus dx/dL = -T 1/T < 0. x xx 
36. We may rewrite equation (5), n. 32 using the fact that 
Loo -rt 0 e 2 g (t2, R)dt2 Loo -rt r 0 e 2 G(t2, R)dt2 • 
It follows that 
- -rt -rt loo loo TxR = rbR(R) 0 e 1 Fx(t1, x)dt1 0 e 2
- -rt -rt loo Loo + r(L+b(R)) 0 e 1 Fx (t1, x)dt1 6 e 2 
Thus, dx/dR = -TxR/Txx < 0, when bR(R) 2_ 0,
positive or negative when bR(R) > O. 
37. Recall that b (R) l+oo _00 b h(b, R)db , from n. 31, 
38. Thus, t2 (R) �00t2g (t2, R)dt2.
39. Proof of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5. 
from the observation that the level of x that 
(5), n. 32, remains unchanged when b (R) replaces 
Similarly, the value of T in equation (3), n. 
40. For a discussion of risk neutrality, see n. 27, 
41. Proof: Let t2(R) be as defined
-rt -rt R loo -Inequality, 0 e 2 g (t2, R)dt2 > e 2( ) • 
27 
A -n. 32, let $x (x) be the value of x when t2 is known to be t2 (R). 
Let xA solve 
$
A
(x) x l/{ (L+ b (R))e 
-rt2 (R) _L}
B Further, let $ (x) be the value of $x (x) with uncertainty. Let 
� solve 
x 
$B (x) x l/{ (L+ b (R)) f" e -rt2 g (t2, R)dt2 - L}
Then $
A
(x) > $B (x) for any x. Since $ (x) < O, from n. 32,x x xx 
supra, then xA < �· 
42. Proof: We first note that equation (5), n. 32, implies that T 
at � (which we denote by T (�)) is larger than T at xA (which 
we denote by T (xA)), i.e. T (xB) > T (xA) for xA f �· Further, for 
any (x,t2) combination, define v (x,R,r,L ;t2) to mean the value 
of the innovation given any t2, where 
v (x,R,r,L;t2) 
- -rt -rt 100 -x + [L+b (R)] ( 0 e 1 F (t1,x)dt1)e 2 
100 -rt -L 0 e 1 F (x,t1)dt1 
and that 
r2 [L + b (R) ] (  [00 e -rtl
•O 
v (x,R,r,L ;t2) t2t2 
By Jensen's Inequality, T (xA) > v (xA, R,r,L;t2 (R) 
Thus T (�) > T (xA) > v (xA,R,r,L;t2 (R)). 
Using this method of proof, by direct extension 
Propositions 6 and 7 hold for both risk neutral 
preferring firms, and for 
a strong enough aversion to risk, the preference 
switch to certainty. 
43. The present value of the benefit for each year 
each entry in column (3) as follows, using the 
Chiang, n. 19, supra, pp. 456-459:
Delay (Years) Present value of benefit, 
1 ($1 million) �00e-rtdt
2 ( $1 million) �00e-rtdt
3 ($1 million) �00e-rtdt
t 
r 
uld 
or 
to 
29 
44. Citations to the contributions of Kamien and Schwartz, Loury, and 
Lee and Wilde are found in n. 1, supra. 
